Finite-state Strategies in Delay Games (full version)

What is a finite-state strategy in a delay game? We answer this surprisingly non-trivial question by presenting a very general framework that allows to remove delay: finite-state strategies exist for all winning conditions where the resulting delay-free game admits a finite-state strategy. The framework is applicable to games whose winning condition is recognized by an automaton with an acceptance condition that satisfies a certain aggregation property. Our framework also yields upper bounds on the complexity of determining the winner of such delay games and upper bounds on the necessary lookahead to win the game. In particular, we cover all previous results of that kind as special cases of our uniform approach

Building Winners? An Empirical Evaluation of Public Business Assistance in the Founding Process

This paper investigates economic and subjective effects of public business assistance delivered to nascent entrepreneurs in Germany. Employing cluster analysis, we explore the actual scope and intensity of business assistance used. Then we analyze predictors of take-up and perceived usefulness taking into account the different patterns of utilized assistance. Finally, we assess economic effects by studying subsequent business performance employing propensity score matching. We cannot reveal that business assistance translates into better start-up performance. However, we find that a lack of personal entrepreneurial resources predicts take-up of business assistance in general as well as perceived usefulness of comprehensive business assistance.entrepreneurship, business assistance, policy evaluation, entrepreneurial resources, big five

Are public sector workers underpaid? - Appropriate comparators in a developing country

How is public sector compensation best aligned with the market? In industrial countries a common reference is the salary paid by private employers for similar jobs (the"jobs approach"). But comparable jobs are formal, and in developing countries the relevant alternative for many public sector workers is informal sector employment. Another approach uses as a reference, the earnings of similar workers in the private sector, regardless of whether their jobs are formal, or informal (the"workers approach"). A potential shortcoming of this approach is that workers may differ in characteristics that are unobservable. The authors assess the importance of this shortcoming, by relying on five econometric methods, four of which correct the bias from unobservable characteristics. The authors focus on state-owned enterprises in Vietnam, which recruited workers on the basis of political loyalty, and other unobservable characteristics. A massive downsizing program, which led to the departure of the most entrepreneurial workers, may have exacerbated the selection bias. However, all the results obtained with the workers approach, fall within a relatively narrow range. They suggest that workers in state-owned enterprises, are overpaid by twenty percent, or more. In contrast, the jobs approach indicates that they could earn two, to six times more in the private sector.Public Sector Economics&Finance,Public Health Promotion,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Health Economics&Finance,Work&Working Conditions,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Health Economics&Finance,Inequality,Poverty Assessment

Algebras of operations in K-theory

We describe explicitly the algebras of degree zero operations in connective and periodic p-local complex K-theory. Operations are written uniquely in terms of certain infinite linear combinations of Adams operations, and we give formulas for the product and coproduct structure maps. It is shown that these rings of operations are not Noetherian. Versions of the results are provided for the Adams summand and for real K-theory.Comment: 25 page

Robust, Recognizable and Legitimate: Strengthening India's Appliance Efficiency Standards and Labels Through Greater Civil Society Involvement

Residential use accounts for 14 percent of global energy consumption. Appliance standards alone could achieve 17 percent energy reductions in the residential sector. Although appliance efficiency standards and labeling programs (AES&L) aim to influence consumer behavior, consumers and civil society often play a limited role in the design, implementation, and monitoring of these programs. This report considers the contribution that civil society organizations can make at each stage of an appliance efficiency standards and labeling program (AES&L), based on experiences in 10 developed and developing countries